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The Right to Life in Normative Instruments

The Right to Life in Normative Instruments

February 27, 2025 
Author: Juan Manuel Palomares Cantero 
Versión en español

 

The right to life is a fundamental right (1) that we all recognize, but do we truly value it as such? We live in a globalized and modern world where technology advances rapidly, and social pressures push us to rethink concepts that should be untouchable. The right to life should not depend on personal autonomy or political interests, yet today, this right is constantly being challenged. Abortion, euthanasia, and end-of-life laws have become ideological debates, not just ethical ones, where human life is no longer considered an inviolable principle. Why? Because we have allowed circumstances and interests to replace the universality and value of life.

As a reader, I invite you to open your mind and challenge the convenient interpretations imposed by a culture that has forgotten the importance of the right to life. It is time to break prejudices, question constructed narratives, and look beyond what we are told. Is a woman’s right to decide over her body enough to deny the life of another human being? Can personal autonomy replace the value of life? Think about it. This article not only aims to analyze international normative instruments that protect life but also to make you reflect on how society and laws should guarantee this right without exception. Life should not be a matter of convenience or power debates. The right to live is inalienable and fundamental, and that is the answer we must embrace.

 

Ethics and Bioethics

Challenging Social Norms Ethics and bioethics aim to critically analyze prevailing morality, meaning the principles and norms that current culture accepts without question (2). In many cases, ideas considered normal or accepted by society are deeply influenced by social, economic, and political interests that do not always respect fundamental human rights. As philosopher Immanuel Kant stated, “Morality does not depend on individual choice but on the recognition of universal principles that must be respected by all” (3). This questioning leads us to reflect on whether we truly value human life or are merely following what is culturally convenient.

 

The Right to Life: A Non-Negotiable Right

The right to life is the fundamental principle upon which all other human rights are built (4). Non-negotiable and universal in its conception, this right should not depend on any other factor. However, in a world where individualism and personal autonomy take precedence over the common good, human life has become a relative value (5). Abortion, often justified by a woman’s autonomy, may initially seem like a legitimate decision. But here arises the central dilemma: a woman’s right to decide over her body cannot outweigh the right to life of another human being. A human life cannot be dependent on mere whims or personal decisions. Why does a life lose its right to exist simply because it cannot defend itself or speak?

This dilemma is not limited to abortion. In euthanasia, personal autonomy is presented as the key argument to justify the right to decide when and how to die, especially in cases of terminal illness or extreme suffering. However, this justification poses a significant contradiction: why should the right to decide the end of life prevail over the basic right to live? This contradiction is not only ethical but also legal and questions the very structure of human rights. If we accept that personal autonomy can replace the right to live, what are we truly protecting? Only individual well-being? This reasoning challenges the inviolability of life.

By allowing the right to die to be treated as an absolute right, we run the serious risk of accepting that human life has no intrinsic value. This relativism takes hold when human lives are eliminated under the argument that the most vulnerable or sick do not have the same social value. If personal autonomy becomes the justification for ending a human life, the fundamental principles that should govern our laws are diluted. Human dignity cannot depend on a utilitarian evaluation of life or on whether a person is perceived as "useful" to society (6).

Personal autonomy is undoubtedly a central value in modern societies, but it must have clear limits, especially when it comes to protecting human life. The right to life must always be an inalienable right. No argument, however legitimate it may seem, can justify its elimination. Human life must be protected from conception to natural death, without exceptions or convenient interpretations. Autonomy cannot be the foundation for denying the fundamental right of every human being to live. Life, in its purest form, is inviolable, and that inviolability must be the priority in the legislation of any society that respects human rights.

 

Life in International Normative Instruments

The right to life is explicitly recognized in major international normative instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (7), which unequivocally states that every person has the right to life. However, this principle should not be subject to relative interpretations based on the political or social circumstances of each country. The protection of life must be non-negotiable, meaning that every human being, from conception to natural death, has the right to be equally protected. Human life is not a negotiable object that depends on momentary convenience or social and political pressures. The intrinsic value of life cannot be evaluated or conditioned, as it is a fundamental priority that must be respected in all its forms.

However, when we examine national legislations, we see that the right to life, especially in the case of the fetus, is undermined by flexible interpretations that respond to political and social interests. In many countries, fetal life is easily dismissed under the pretext that the mother has the right to decide over her body. But this interpretation creates a hierarchy of lives that has no ethical or legal justification. Why should a fetus's life be valued less than the mother's autonomy? Is it legitimate to deprive a developing human being of rights simply because it cannot express itself? This is the fundamental dilemma, and the answer must be clear: every human life, from its very beginning, must be equally respected and protected, regardless of its stage of development.

 

Abortion and Euthanasia: Competing Rights

Abortion and euthanasia represent two rights that, in various circumstances, directly compete with the fundamental right to life. In the case of abortion, it is argued that a woman's right to decide over her body justifies the elimination of fetal life. However, this reasoning raises a fundamental question: to what extent can an individual's right to decide over their body override another human being’s right to life? The answer is clear: there is no moral justification that allows a human life to be eliminated by another’s decision. Human life cannot be subordinated to the autonomy of another being, especially when it is an inalienable right that must be protected from conception.

Similarly, in the case of euthanasia, it is argued that individuals should have the right to decide when to die if they are facing extreme suffering or a terminal illness (10). While personal autonomy is an important value in our societies, this right directly conflicts with the universal protection of life. Dignified death should not be seen as the right to decide when to die but as the right to live with dignity until the last moment, ensuring that no life is ended under the pretext of personal autonomy or suffering (11). Society has a responsibility to protect human life in all its stages, without exceptions, and to guarantee that no life is eliminated due to individual decisions that do not respect the inalienable value of human life.

 

Conclusions

The right to life is, above all, a fundamental and inalienable principle that must be protected without exceptions or delays. As we face increasing ethical, political, and social challenges, it is crucial to remember that this right is not conditioned by external circumstances such as personal autonomy or social welfare. Laws and international instruments must ensure that life is always respected and protected, avoiding flexible interpretations that justify its elimination. Human dignity and the right to life are the foundation of any just and equitable society, and it must be our priority to ensure that they are not diluted under any convenient or circumstantial interpretation.

 

References

1. Requena López T. Sobre el derecho a la vida. ReDCE Año 6 Núm. 2009;12:283–342. 

2. Marcano LM. Bioética: Del Código de Núremberg a la jurisprudencia. KAIRÓS, REVISTA DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS, JURÍDICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS. 2024 Jan 15;7(12):9–23. 

3. Immanuel Kant I. Fundamentación para una metafísica de las costumbres [Internet]. Versión castellana y estudio preliminar de Roberto R. Aramayo, editor. 2012. Available from: www.alianzaeditorial.es  

4. Medina Quiroga C. El derecho a la vida. Convención Americana: teoría y jurisprudencia. Revista de Derecho Constitucional. 2005;59–77. 

5. González J. Libertad, autonomía y justicia: ¿En crisis durante la crisis? Vol. 26, Ano. 2020. 

6. Tasset J. La ética utilitarista de Jeremy Bentham: del ser al deber ser. Télos. 2021 Nov 11;1–14. 

7. Asamblea General. Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos. 1966. 

8. Ausín FJ, & PL. Derecho a la vida y eutanasia: ¿acortar la vida o acortar la muerte? Rev Antopol Soc. 1995;19:191–204. 

9. Juan Pablo II. Evangelium Vitae: Encíclica sobre el valor y la inviolabilidad de la vida humana [Internet]. 1995 [cited 2025 Feb 24]. Available from: https://www.vatican.va  

10. Secretaría de Salud. https://www.gob.mx/inapam/articulos/ley-de-voluntad-anticipada-el-derecho-a-una-muerte-digna  2023. Ley de voluntad anticipada, el derecho a una muerte digna. 

11. Cortés M. El Derecho a la Muerte Digna como Alcance a la Vida Digna. Polo del Conocimiento. 2022;7(1):234–49. 

 

 

Juan Manuel Palomares Cantero is a lawyer, holds a master's degree, and a PhD in Bioethics from Universidad Anáhuac, Mexico. He has served as Director of Human Capital, Director, and General Coordinator at the Faculty of Bioethics. Currently, he works as a researcher in the Academic Directorate of Integral Formation at the same university. He is a member of the Mexican National Academy of Bioethics and the Latin American and Caribbean Federation of Bioethics Institutions. This article was assisted in its writing by the use of ChatGPT, an artificial intelligence tool developed by OpenAI. 

 


The opinions shared in this blog are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and do not necessarily represent a unanimous view of the seminars, nor do they reflect an official position by CADEBI. We value and encourage any comments, responses, or constructive criticism you may wish to share. 

 


Más información:
Centro Anáhuac de Desarrollo Estratégico en Bioética (CADEBI)
Dr. Alejandro Sánchez Guerrero
alejandro.sanchezg@anahuac.mx