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A multiple regime extension to the Heston–Nandi GARCH(1,1) model

In this article a multiple regime extension of a Heston–Nandi GARCH(1,1) class of models is presented to describe the asymmetries and intermittent dynamics in financial volatility. The statistical properties and the estimation of their parameters are addressed in detail. The number of regimes in the model is determined through a statistical procedure based on a robust Lagrange Multiplier (LM) specification.

Understanding affective evaluation in retail: consumers perspective

Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of the consumer’s emotional shopping experience on the perception of benefits and on the corporate reputation of a department store.

Design/methodology/approach
This study was applied to a non-probabilistic sample survey proportionally distributed among the main department stores in Chile and Mexico.

El efecto del liderazgo, aprendizaje organizacional y administración del conocimiento en la percepción de la innovación del personal operativo en la Ciudad de México

El objetivo de este estudio es ofrecer una explicación de los factores que tienen un impacto en la percepción de la innovación del personal operativo en empresas mexicanas. Mediante un estudio exploratorio, se detectaron 26 atributos de la innovación. Se diseñó un instrumento para medir la percepción sobre el cumplimiento de estos atributos. Se integró una muestra de 925 personas de nivel operativo de empresas mexicanas manufactureras y de servicio. Los atributos se agruparon en cuatro dimensiones mediante un análisis factorial confirmatorio.

A Stackelberg security Markov game based on partial information for strategic decision making against unexpected attacks

Abstract 
This paper considers an important class of Stackelberg security problems, which is characterized by the fact that defenders and attackers have incomplete information at each stage about the value of the current state. The inability to observe the exact state is motivated by the fact that it is impossible to measure exactly the state variables of the defenders and attackers. Most existing approaches for computing Stackelberg security games provide no guarantee if the estimated model is inaccurate.

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